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Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine
Despite its natural advantages, Ukraine has one
of the lowest rates of FDI in the CEE/CIS region.
A survey of foreign investors reveals the main rea5
sons for Ukraine's under5performance in terms of
FDI to be its inferior investment climate   (legal,
economic, and infrastructure), as well as deficien5
cies in the country's privatisation approach and
effort. Given that market seeking   is a dominant
drive of foreign investors, Ukrainian policy should
focus on lowering entry barriers.
Another study shows that most foreign investors
in Ukraine are in favour of land privatisation,
and that they would be willing to increase their
investment commitments to Ukraine if land was
a tradable commodity.
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Defining the Interests  
and Potential of Foreign  
Direct Investors in Ukraine 
Preface 
This study focuses on investigating the possible links between 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and privatisation policy in 
Ukraine by surveying foreign investors who are interested in 
Ukraine as a recipient country. Out of all the identified 
groups of direct investors (multinational, institutional, and 
entrepreneurial), multinational enterprises (MNEs) are of 
the greatest interest as best practice firms whose resources 
dominate over those of the rest of the investor categories.  
The study was performed by the Flemings/SARS Consor?
tium, led by Robert Fleming & Co. Limited, as part of the 
project “Strengthening the State Property Fund: Individual 
Privatisation of Enterprises” within the technical assistance 
component of the Enterprise Development Adjustment Loan 
from the World Bank. The Flemings/SARS Consortium 
hired Alina Kudina and Vitali Nosov as short?term consult?
ants to work on the study. This study report is being pub?
lished with the permission of the State Property Fund of 
Ukraine. 
The study is based on a survey which was conducted in De?
cember –January  and covered , foreign direct 
investors who entered or were seeking to enter Ukraine’s 
market. 
The report is organised in five chapters. The first chapter 
reviews Ukraine’s track record in attracting FDI. The second 
starts with a theoretical framework for analysing the motives 
of foreign direct investors and the role of privatisation in 
channelling FDI. ‘Data and Survey Methodology’ describes 
the survey technique, as well as provides a profile of the sam?
ple of investors. ‘Survey Findings’ summarises and analyses 
the survey responses. ‘Policy Recommendations’ infers policy 
recommendations for Ukrainian authorities.  
The authors of this report are grateful to all respondents for 
their cooperation and valuable input to this study.  
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Executive Summary 
FDI Underperformance 
Despite its natural comparative advantages, Ukraine has one 
of the lowest rates of FDI in the CEE/CIS region. Its current 
FDI stock per capita equals US$ (as of ), which ex?
ceeds only that of Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. 
Survey Targets 
In order to identify the reasons for FDI underperformance in 
Ukraine, we performed a mail survey of  companies with 
representation in Ukraine, grouping them into multi?
national enterprises (MNEs), multilateral financial institu?
tions, private institutional investors, and entrepreneurs. Be?
sides requesting them to identify the major deterrents to in?
vestment and to estimate the significance of privatisation for 
FDI, the survey also asked the sampled investors about their 
motives, risk appetite and decision?making mechanisms while 
investing in Ukraine. We also inquired about the investors’ 
assesment of priorities for their investment?enhancing policy 
agenda. The resulting sample includes  entities:  multilat?
eral financial institutions,  entrepreneurial firms,  direct 
equity funds, and  MNEs. The response ratio was %. 
As was to be expected based on the accumulated evidence 
from other transition economies, Ukraine’s under?
performance in terms of FDI is to be explained, at least 
partly, by its inferior investment climate (legal, economic, 
and infrastructure aspects), as well as by deficiencies in the 
country’s privatisation approach and effort. Implicit evidence 
for the inadequacy of Ukraine’s privatisation effort may be 
found in the fact that most of the mail survey respondents 
(including % of the MNEs) reported that they had invested 
in Ukraine through green?field projects or joint ventures with 
private companies rather than through privatisation offer?
ings—whilst many of the multinational companies not cur?
rently looking at investing in Ukraine also proclaimed their 
preference for green?field investments. 
Origin of Investments 
As of January , the mail survey respondents committed 
over US$ billion in FDI, which represents almost two?thirds 
of Ukraine’s total FDI stock, and employed some , peo?
ple. By country of origin, the USA was by far the largest inves?
tor, with the European Union second. Our sample omitted 
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Russian firms, a significant group of investors in Ukraine, as 
we tried to focus on best practice, which is typically found 
among Western firms. In addition, Russian firms are typically 
more secretive about their business dealings than their West?
ern counterparts. 
Sectoral Preferences 
In terms of sectoral preferences, the sampled firms were most 
frequently found in the food/beverages sector (the # desti?
nation for FDI in Ukraine, according to official statistics), 
followed by agriculture and telecommunications. Other 
prominent investment targets included the mechanical engi?
neering, retail/fast food, banking, and consumer goods sec?
tors. 
Investment Amounts 
In terms of investment amounts, the sample in Ukraine 
seems to range across a wide spectrum, with the greater pro?
portion being on medium?sized investments (US$– mil?
lion). Besides the EBRD, only MNEs were able to commit 
amounts over US$ million. In the makeup of investments, 
institutional investors (multilateral and private) invest mostly 
cash, while entrepreneurs and MNEs make most of their con?
tributions in kind. 
Investment Motives 
The survey provides strong evidence that market?seeking ac?
tivities are the most dominant motives for FDI in Ukraine, 
well ahead of other possible reasons (including pursuit of 
cheap and qualified labour). Most investors are attracted to 
Ukraine by its extensive domestic market of  million peo?
ple. The availability of low?cost labour turned out to be insig?
nificant for the majority of companies surveyed, except en?
trepreneurial investors who tend to be more sensitive to the 
availability of cheap input factors. Although Ukrainian wages 
are lower than in other East European countries, this com?
petitive advantage is diminished by significantly lower labour 
productivity, the lack of capital, inferior management, and 
regulatory burdens, making unit costs higher in Ukraine than 
in neighbouring countries. 
Expected Internal Rates of Return (IRRs) 
Although Ukraine is one of the most risky countries in the 
CEE region, the required IRR is only –% for the majority 
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of investors. Large multinationals that enjoy a low cost of 
capital usually require lower returns (below %) than insti?
tutional and entrepreneurial investors. Due to their relatively 
low cost of capital and given their political goals, multilateral 
institutions can undertake investment projects in Ukraine 
with a single?digit IRR. However, their resources are unlikely 
to cover Ukraine’s investment needs, and they often cannot 
make investments without Western industry operators in?
volved. MNEs are therefore the best option for long?term in?
vestment in Ukraine. 
Timeframe for Decision Making 
Most survey respondents reported that their investment deci?
sion making takes typically more than  months. Institutional 
investors can usually decide on certain investment projects 
within a period of  to  months. However, they tend to have 
the highest number of decision makers (). On the other 
hand, some entrepreneurial investors can commit to invest?
ing within a month after the opportunity is identified. On 
average, in such organisations  persons are involved in tak?
ing the decision on investment in Ukraine. The most compli?
cated and lengthy decision?making process was reported for 
multilateral financial institutions. 
Major Deterrents for FDI 
The survey ranks the major deterrents to FDI in Ukraine in 
the following order (descending in significance):  
• instability and exorbitance of the regulations; 
• ambiguity of the legal system;  
• uncertainty of the economic environment;  
• corruption;  
• high tax burden;  
• problems establishing clear ownership conditions;  
• depressed disposable income levels;  
• difficulty negotiating with government and privatisation 
authorities;  
• volatility of the political environment;  
• lack of physical infrastructure;  
• problems in accessing domestic and export markets.  
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It is noteworthy that all these impediments were recognised 
as causing problems. Though on the lower end of the rank?
ing, clarity of ownership rights and ease of negotiating with 
government/privatisation authorities were ranked between 
‘major problem’ and ‘minor problem’, i.e., they were per?
ceived as significant FDI deterrents. 
Suggested Policies 
The policy agenda priorities suggested by the survey respon?
dents comprised the liberalisation of capital, foreign ex?
change and profit repatriation controls, the lifting of restric?
tions on foreign ownership and control, the minimisation of 
red tape, and the reduction of tax rates and number of taxes. 
On the other hand, improvements in physical infrastructure 
and increasing import barriers were rated to be of low prior?
ity. In brief, the suggested policy agenda may be summarised 
as follows: investors want to deal with fewer government offi?
cials, and less frequently. Many of them believe that a com?
prehensive and rigorous privatisation approach would lead to 
this end. 
Importance of Privatisation Policies 
As anticipated, the status of privatisation in Ukraine was 
found to be significant for the majority of mail survey re?
spondents. Only % of respondents (deep?pocketed MNEs) 
found privatisation status unimportant in their activity. For 
the rest of the investors (%), privatisation policy appears to 
be a very significant factor, which affects their investment 
decisions. It is expected that privatisation will not only create 
new acquisition opportunities, but also enhance the overall 
business climate, through productivity growth and reduction 
of unproductive government interference. While the impor?
tance of privatisation in creating acquisition opportunities 
was recognised by most institutional (private and multilat?
eral) and entrepreneurial investors, it was surprising to note 
that the sampled MNEs do not significantly rely on privatisa?
tion while structuring their strategy in Ukraine.  
Policy Recommendation 
The survey results in a number of policy recommendations 
for Ukraine’s FDI policy in general, and its privatisation pol?
icy in particular. In a nutshell, Ukraine’s privatisation policy 
has to be tailored more towards the preferences of MNEs, 
who have so far failed to participate in Ukraine’s privatisation 
process in any significant way.  
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Ukraine’s Track Record  
in Attracting FDI 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment 
involving a long?term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (for?
eign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise 
resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct 
investor. 
Whilst financial aid from multilateral institutions (e.g., IMF, 
World Bank, EBRD) is of crucial importance for Ukraine in 
the short term, in the longer term developing countries need 
to rely on private capital flows to provide non?debt sources of 
funding for monetary stabilisation and restructuring. This 
claim is supported by the experience of developing countries 
like Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, which have 
been highly successful in building a development strategy 
based on foreign investment. 
Ukraine is a potentially attractive place to invest, insofar as 
the country possesses a large amount of unused or underused 
physical and human capital, substantial reserves of idle sav?
ings (estimated in the billions of US dollars), a large domestic 
market of  million people (one of the largest in Europe), 
and easy access to the even larger markets of Russia and other 
former Soviet republics. In addition, due to its strategic im?
portance, Ukraine is now the third?largest recipient of US 
foreign aid, after Israel and Egypt. Ukraine has also received 
substantial funding from multilateral organisations such as 
the World Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD. Much of this fund?
ing has been given in the form of technical assistance for 
building a market economy and a framework of legal institu?
tions to underpin the capitalist economy. 
Nevertheless, Ukraine has the dubious distinction of being 
one of the least attractive countries for foreign investors in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Ukraine has 
lagged behind other Eastern and Central European countries 
in attracting FDI flows to its territory. Moreover, in  FDI 
net inflows declined vs. the moderate – levels, pre?
sumably because of the depressed state of the domestic econ?
omy and the perception of a heightened political risk in the 
country due to the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
                                                                
  World Investment Report : Trends and Determinants, UNCTAD 
(New York and Geneva ) 
Ukraine has the dubious 
distinction of being one 
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ing FDI flows to its  
territory. 
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According to official Ukrainian data, as of early January , 
the cumulative FDI inflow into Ukraine since  ap?
proached US$. billion. In , Ukraine received only 
US$ million. 
In –, Ukraine’s performance in winning FDI was 
roughly at par with the CIS average and Russia. However, 
within its peer group of other transition economies in Cen?
tral and Eastern Europe and the NIS, Ukraine has outper?
formed only Belarus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
Cumulative FDI (–) per capita 
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Source: EBRD Transition Report   
From a sector perspective, as of early January , the main 
destination of FDI in Ukraine was the domestic food industry 
(% of cumulative FDI), followed by domestic trade opera?
tions (over %) and mechanical engineering/metals (al?
most %). This sectoral ranking has persisted in its current 
configuration since late .  
By origin of investment, the United States has been the 
dominant foreign investor. US companies have made invest?
ments valued at some US$ million, representing % of 
all FDI made in Ukraine. The USA is followed by the Nether?
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lands with %, the Russian Federation (%), Germany (%) 
and the United Kingdom (%). The prominent position of 
Cyprus (%) is explained by the fact of its favourable tax ar?
rangements with Ukraine, which has caused many Ukrain?
ian—also Western—companies to use Cyprus as a location for 
newly founded companies investing in Ukraine. 
FDI Stock by Country of Origin 
cumulative, since 
Country January ,  January ,  
 US$ mil % of total US$ mil % of total 
United States  .  . 
Netherlands  .  . 
Russia  .  . 
United Kingdom  .  . 
Germany  .  . 
Cyprus  .  . 
South Korea  .  . 
Source: State Statistics Committee
Theoretical Framework 
Host Country Determinants of FDI 
The most important determinants for the location of FDI are 
economic considerations, which we will examin in turn. They 
come into full play once an enabling FDI policy framework is 
in place. Being based on the principal motivations of MNEs 
for investing in foreign countries, economic determinants 
can be grouped into three clusters: resource?seeking, market?
seeking and efficiency?seeking, as shown in the table below. 
The availability of natural resources, cheap unskilled or semi?
skilled labour, creative assets, and physical infrastructure 
promote resource?seeking activities. Historically, the most 
important host country determinant of FDI has been the 
availability of natural resources, e.g., minerals, raw materials 
and agricultural products. In the nineteenth century, "much 
of the FDI by European and United States firms was 
prompted by the need to secure an economic and reliable 
source of minerals, primary products for the investing indus?
Economic determinants 
of FDI can be grouped 
into three clusters: re0
source0seeking, market0
seeking and efficiency0
seeking 
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trialising nations of Europe and North America". Up to the 
eve of the Second World War, about % of the world stock 
of FDI was in natural resources. 
Host Country Determinants of FDI 
Host country determinants Type of FDI  
classified by 
motives of 
firms  
Principal economic  
determinants in host countries 
 
Market?
seeking 
Market size and per capita in?
come 
Market growth 
Access to regional and global 
markets 
Country?specific consumer 
preferences 
Structure of markets 
Policy framework for FDI 
Economic, political, and social stabil?
ity 
Rules regarding entry and operations 
Standards of treatment of foreign 
affiliates 
Policies on functioning and structure 
of markets (especially competition 
and policies governing mergers and 
acquisitions) 
International agreements on FDI  
Privatisation policy 
Trade policy (tariffs and non?tariff 
barriers) and coherence of FDI and 
trade policies 
Tax policy 
Economic determinants 
 
Resource/
asset?
seeking 
 
Raw materials 
Low?cost unskilled labour 
Skilled labour 
Technological, innovative, and 
other created assets (for ex?
ample, brand names), includ?
ing as embodied in individu?
als, firms, and clusters 
Physical infrastructure (ports, 
roads, power, telecommunica?
tions) 
Business facilitation 
Investment promotion (including 
image?building and investment?
generating activities and investment?
facilitation services) 
Investment incentives 
Hassle costs (related to corruption 
and administrative efficiency) 
Social amenities (for example, bilin?
gual schools, quality of life) 
After?investment services  
 
 
Efficiency?
seeking 
 
Cost of resources and assets 
listed above, adjusted for la?
bour productivity 
Other input costs, such as 
transport and communication 
costs to/from and within host 
economy and other intermedi?
ate products  
Membership of a regional in?
tegration agreement condu?
cive to the establishment of 
regional corporate networks 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report : Trends and Determinants. Table IV.. p. 
                                                                
 Dunning, John H. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 
Addison?Wesley (Wokingham, England ) 
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While being a prominent FDI determinant, the presence of 
natural resources by itself was not sufficient for FDI to take 
place. Comparative advantage in natural resources usually 
gave rise to trade rather than to FDI. Investment took place 
when resource?abundant countries either lacked the large 
amounts of capital typically required for resource extraction 
or lacked the technical skills needed to extract or sell raw ma?
terials to the rest of the world. In addition, infrastructure fa?
cilities for getting the raw materials out of the host country 
and to its final destination had to be in place, or needed to be 
created. 
Labour?seeking investment is usually undertaken by manu?
facturing and service MNEs from countries with high real 
labour costs. These MNEs set up or acquire subsidiaries in 
countries with lower real labour costs, to supply labour inten?
sive intermediate or final products. Frequently, to attract 
such production, host countries have set up free trade or ex?
port processing zones. 
Another highly important group of economic determinants 
of FDI are market factors, such as market size (both in abso?
lute terms and in relation to the size and income of its popu?
lation) and market growth. For multinational firms, new 
markets provide a chance to stay competitive and grow within 
the industry, as well as to achieve scale and scope economies. 
Traditionally, market size and growth as FDI determinants 
related to national markets for manufacturing products shel?
tered from international competition by high tariffs or quotas 
that triggered "tariff?jumping" FDI. Market access was para?
mount in the wave of the United States investment in Europe 
during the early post?war period, and in Japanese investments 
in the United States after the mid?s, following voluntary 
export restrictions and the possibility of further protectionist 
measures in the automobile industry.  
National markets were also important for many service 
MNEs, although the principal reason was not the existence of 
tariffs, but the fact that most services were not tradable and 
therefore the only way to deliver them to foreign markets was 
through establishments abroad. Apart from market size and 
trade restrictions, MNEs might be prompted to engage in 
market?seeking investment if and when their main suppliers 
or customers have set up foreign production facilities, and if, 
in order to retain their business, they need to follow them 
overseas. However, undoubtedly the most important reason for mar0
ket0seeking investment remains the action of host governments encour0
aging such investment. The traditional instrument chosen by 
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governments has been to impose tariffs or other import con?
trols. History suggests that the majority of first?time manufac?
turing and service investments were undertaken to circum?
vent such trade barriers. 
The motivation of efficiency?seeking FDI is to rationalise the 
structure of established resource?based or market?seeking 
investment in such a way that the investing company can gain 
from the common governance of geographically dispersed 
activities. The intention of the efficiency?seeking MNE is to 
take advantage of different factor endowments, cultures, in?
stitutional arrangements, economic systems and policies, and 
market structures, by concentrating production in a limited 
number of locations to supply multiple markets. To make the 
efficiency?seeking foreign production take place, cross?
border markets must be both well?developed and open. This 
is why foreign production usually flourishes in regionally in?
tegrated markets. However, it is worth noting that in the early 
s many of the larger MNEs pursued pluralistic objec?
tives, and most were engaged in FDI that combines the char?
acteristics of each of the abovementioned categories. The 
motives for foreign production may also change when, for 
example, a firm becomes an established and experienced 
foreign investor. 
Considering Ukraine as a host country, one could expect a 
large amount of resource? and market?seeking FDI: the for?
mer is due to availability of cheap labour and rather abun?
dant agricultural products; high trade barriers and large in?
ternal market promote the latter. In contrast, conditions for 
efficiency?seeking investment are unclear: from one side, 
cross?border trade is restricted, from another, Ukraine is a 
member of different regional integration agreements condu?
cive to trade facilitation. 
Types of Foreign Direct Investors 
Foreign direct investors may be divided into three categories: 
• multinational enterprises, abbreviated as MNEs; 
• institutional investors (including multilateral donor or?
ganisations like the EBRD and IFC); 
• entrepreneurial investors. 
Although the notion of a “strategic investor” is most often 
applied to MNEs (due to the reasons spelt out below), all 
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three investor types can and often do play the role of what is 
called a ”strategic investor”. 
MNEs 
MNEs are incorporated or unincorporated enterprises com?
prising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates. A par?
ent enterprise in this context is defined as an enterprise 
which controls legal entities outside its home country, usually 
by owning a certain equity capital stake. An equity capital 
stake of  per cent or more of the ordinary shares or voting 
power of an incorporated enterprise, or its equivalent for an 
unincorporated enterprise, is normally considered as a 
threshold for the control of assets. A foreign affiliate is an 
incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an in?
vestor, who is resident in another country, owns a stake that 
permits a lasting interest in the management of that enter?
prise. A foreign affiliate can take the form of subsidiary, asso?
ciate enterprise, or branch. 
As a rule, MNEs are long?term investors who seek market, 
efficiency, or resource gratification by investing in a certain 
country. They can sacrifice short?term profits for long?term 
benefits like market share, R&D potential, or secure resource 
supply. MNE investment decisions are often motivated by 
internalisation incentives, such as: 
• avoiding search and negotiating costs; 
• avoiding costs of broken contracts and ensuing litigation; 
• buyer uncertainty; 
• capturing economies of interdependent activities and 
common governance; 
• controlling market outlets. 
By virtue of being typically well?capitalised companies, MNEs 
enjoy a relatively low cost of capital, which keeps their re?
quired internal rates of return very modest. Their relatively 
easy access to capital gives them deep enough pockets to tol?
erate losses for a relatively long period of time. MNEs are 
typically best practice firms within their industries, and as 
such are valuable sources of superior technologies and skills, 
which may lead to enhancements in local production. 
Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors are financial intermediaries who typically 
raise funds by selling shares in investment funds to the public 
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and invest the proceeds in a diversified portfolio of securities 
or equity. By investing in a fund, an investor can obtain 
broad?based ownership of a sufficient number of securities, 
either within a sector of the financial market or across market 
sectors, thus reducing his overall portfolio risk. 
Most institutional investors are purely passive portfolio inves?
tors, who buy and sell shares on the secondary markets. For 
reasons of risk reduction, they will typically not take signifi?
cant positions in one particular company, and are usually not 
actively involved in a company’s management. These passive 
investors are typically not classified as foreign direct investors. 
In the context of FDI, only direct equity (or private equity) funds 
enter the picture. These are investment vehicles mostly 
funded by a pool of investors with medium?term investment 
horizons (typically ? years). Direct equity funds typically 
take substantial stakes in target companies (exceeding a 
blocking minority of %), and take an active role in the 
company’s management. They typically aim to exit the inves?
tee company within a period of ? years, either through an 
IPO of the investee firm, a sale to a strategic investor or a sale 
to the existing owners of the target firm. They achieve their 
superior returns by taking advantage of capital market ineffi?
ciency and by enabling their target firms to invest in value?
positive projects. In Ukraine, country?dedicated or region?
dedicated funds are most common. 
Within the category of institutional investors, there is a sepa?
rate group of multilateral investors such as the EBRD and the 
IFC. Unlike their privately financed counterparts, they are 
funded by governments and as such have distinct investment 
strategies and investment criteria. Their cost of capital is 
equal to prime MNEs, while their investment objectives are 
broader than pure maximisation of returns. In the context of 
CEE transition economies, their objectives frequently involve 
facilitation of enterprise restructuring, fostering market con?
ditions, and sustainable development. Therefore, this inves?
tor group is treated separately from the rest of institutional 
investors in our study. 
Entrepreneurial Investors 
Entrepreneurial investors (entrepreneurial high net?worth indi?
viduals or smaller foreign firms operating within few coun?
tries) typically act as economic agents who attempt to exploit 
country/sector/enterprise?specific advantages via direct in?
vestment in local companies. Usually, their investment behav?
iour is opportunistic as they seek high?return possibilities 
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within a short time?horizon. Having a high cost of capital and 
limited access, they are not in a position to incur continuous 
losses in anticipation of long?term benefits. They also tend to 
target smaller enterprises, as limited availability of invest?
ment funding makes it difficult for them to digest large busi?
nesses, at least at the initial stage. 
FDI and Privatisation Policy 
The history of privatisation in CEE gave rise to a variety of 
privatisation methods, ranging from voucher privatisation to 
management/employee buy?outs and to strategic sales. It is 
worth noting that these different privatisation methods tend 
to have vastly different effects on corporate performance. 
Whilst there is growing evidence suggesting that voucher pri?
vatisation, which results in dispersed ownership, often fails to 
increase the efficiency of privatised enterprises, market entry 
by foreign firms tends to create competition and has a posi?
tive effect on the transition process. The World Bank classi?
fies the trade?offs among privatisation methods as follows: 
Trade0offs among Privatisation Routes (large firms) 
Method/Objective Better cor?
porate gov?
ernance 
Speed and 
feasibility 
Better ac?
cess to capi?
tal and skills 
More gov?
ernment 
revenue 
Greater 
fairness 
Sale to outside owners + ? + + ? 
Management?employee 
buyout 
? + ? ? ? 
Equal?access voucher pri?
vatisation 
? + ? ? + 
Spontaneous privatisation ? ? ? ? ? 
Source:  World Development Report, World Bank  
Privatisation and Corporate Performance in Ukraine 
A recent study conducted by Estrin and Rosevear, which was 
based on a survey of  Ukrainian firms, seems to challenge 
the general hypothesis regarding the positive relationship 
between privatisation and improved corporate performance. 
Based on a measurement of productivity and profitability 
                                                                
 Estrin S.; Rosevear A. Enterprise Performance and Corporate Governance 
in Ukraine, Paper presented at London Business School CIS?Middle 
Europe centre Workshop on Corporate Governance in Russia 
() 
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between privatised and state?owned firms, the study claims 
that, contrary to common expectations, privatised Ukrainian 
companies have not been able to deliver performance supe?
rior to state?owned companies. 
However, Estrin and Rosevear’s study admits that within their 
sample (and among Ukrainian enterprises overall) the weight 
of foreign direct ownership was negligible. The privatised 
companies investigated typically had mostly individuals, fi?
nancial intermediaries, and banks as “outside owners”. This is 
due to the fact that in the period between  and , 
management?employee buyouts and voucher privatisation 
were the preferred privatisation methods. These forms of 
privatisation failed to bring more investment, more efficient 
management, or better performance to the majority of 
Ukrainian enterprises. 
The absence of significant foreign strategic ownership might 
explain their failure to identify any positive impact of privati?
sation on corporate performance. Other reasons for the ab?
sence of clear evidence of a positive impact of privatisation 
on the performance of Ukrainian enterprises may be the fol?
lowing: 
• A weak legal framework makes it hard for outsiders to 
exercise any real control over companies in which they 
have a majority stake. 
• Outsiders gain dominant shareholdings only in the worst 
firms, since insiders control the privatisation process. 
• Most enterprises have been privatised for less than three 
years; the benefits of privatisation may therefore still lie 
in the future. 
• One?third of privatised enterprises still have the govern?
ment as a substantial shareholder (up to %). 
• Government continues to interfere in some sensitive sec?
tors (e.g., energy sector). 
• Insiders are dominant owners in the ownership structure 
of many medium?sided and a majority of large enter?
prises. 
At the same time, other studies on corporate performance in 
Ukraine show a slightly different picture. For example, a re?
Although mass privatisa0
tion allowed for access to 
Ukrainian enterprises by 
outsiders, qualified out0
side investors remained 
largely on the sidelines. 
Thus, the failure to at0
tract best0practice firms as 
strategic investors for 
local enterprises is the 
major contributing factor 
in explaining the limited 
privatisation impact in 
Ukraine. 
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cent study by Szyrmer et al. indicates that by  differences 
started to emerge in the performance of mainly government?
controlled and non?government controlled sectors. Industrial 
sectors, which are not subject to government regulation of 
prices, conform to the generally accepted pattern whereby 
non?state enterprises typically display a more efficient use of 
labour and capital, and thus achieve better profitability. 
In sum, although mass privatisation allowed for access to 
Ukrainian enterprises by outsiders, qualified outside inves?
tors (i.e., best?practice firms acting as strategic investors) re?
mained largely on the sidelines. Thus, the failure to attract 
best?practice firms as strategic investors for the local enter?
prises is the major contributing factor in explaining the lim?
ited impact of privatisation in Ukraine. 
Data and Survey Methodology 
Description of Survey Approach 
We performed a detailed survey of foreign investors, who 
were asked to answer a questionnaire on their perception of 
investment risks and rewards for direct investment in 
Ukraine, as well as their view on the role of privatisation. The 
survey was conducted through personal interviews and mail?
out questionnaires, addressed to senior executives of foreign 
companies already operating in Ukraine or intending to 
launch Ukrainian operations. 
While selecting the companies, we tried to form a representa?
tive sample by taking into account different types of industry, 
company sizes, countries of origin, and types of investment. 
The sectors of most interest to investors (food processing, 
trade and commerce, engineering and metals, finance and 
insurance, chemicals) found their representation in the sam?
ple. The sample also includes companies of different sizes. In 
addition, representatives of all the four identified types of 
investors (MNEs, entrepreneurs, investment funds, and mul?
tilateral institutions) were included in the sample. 
The target sample was made up of  companies. Out of the 
 companies contacted,  responded, constituting a nor?
mal response ratio for a survey of this kind. The final sample 
may be divided as follows: 
                                                                
 Szyrmer, J.; Dubrovskyj, V.; Shigaeva, T. “Non?government sector 
works better”, Policy Studies, ,#, p.. 
We performed a detailed 
survey of foreign inves0
tors, who were asked to 
answer a questionnaire 
on their perception of the 
risks and rewards for 
direct investment. While 
selecting the companies, 
we tried to form a repre0
sentative sample. As of 
the date of the survey 
respondents had in0
vested, or committed to 
invest, over US$ billion 
in Ukraine. 
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Foreign Investors: Survey Participants 
Type of Investor Contacted Replied 
 Number % of total Number % of total
MNE     
Entrepreneurs     
Institutional      
Multilateral     
Total     
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
Portrait of Mail0Shot Survey Sample 
As of the date of the survey, i.e., January , the survey re?
spondents had invested, or committed to invest, over  
US$ billion in Ukraine. This represents almost two?thirds of 
the total FDI stock in Ukraine.  
Geographic Distribution of Sampled Companies 









Multilateral MNE Entrepreneurial Institutional
US/Americas
EU/Europe
Source: Flemings/SARS survey 
In terms of the country of origin, US firms prevail. This is 
consistent with the aggregate FDI statistics, which indicate 
the USA as the # country of origin for FDI in Ukraine. Out 
of the  companies surveyed,  companies are headquar?
tered in the US, one in Canada, and the rest are in the EU or 
elsewhere in Europe. American firms dominate among MNEs 
and entrepreneurial firms, while Europeans prevail among 
institutional investors. 
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Our resulting sample is not fully balanced between the major 
types of investors (MNEs, entrepreneurs, investment funds 
and multilateral institutions). However, this imbalance re?
flects the fact that MNEs make up the dominant investor 
group in Ukraine in terms of investment amounts. They also 
represent our focus group, owing to their superiority (as best?
practice firms) as strategic investors. Therefore, MNEs ac?
count for two?thirds of the survey respondents. 
The next chart depicts our sample breakdown, according to 
the sector of investment.  
Distribution of Sampled Companies by Sector 
Banking
%
Consumer goods
%
Other/Misc.
%
Retail/Fast food
%
Engineering
%
Telecoms
%
Food/Beverages
%
Agri
%
 
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
Overall, the sector structure of the sampled firms turned out 
to be in line with countrywide patterns. In agreement with 
Ukraine’s statistics, the food sector assumes the top position 
as an FDI destination in our sample. Besides MNEs, it is also 
the prime sector of focus for institutional investors, owing to 
its superior fundamentals and competitive position in the 
Ukrainian economy. Ukraine’s food sector is followed by ag?
ricultural business, telecoms and engineering. 
                                                                
 Whilst this proportional distribution of the industry sectors of in?
terest to the sampled firms corresponds with the overall FDI statis?
tics, and this suggests that the sample presents an adequate repre?
sentation of industry preferences worldwide, the sample may not be 
fully representative. Secondly, there might be a self?selection bias, 
i.e., in focusing mostly on the firms with representation in Ukraine, 
we might have omitted other potential investors who would like to 
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In terms of investment amounts, the sample seems to be rep?
resentative across a wide spectrum of investments. However, 
greater emphasis is accorded to medium?size investments 
(US$? millions), which account for the majority of FDI 
inflows to Ukraine.  
Distribution of Sampled Companies  
by Investment Size 
%
%
%
%
%
%
>US$ mil  
US$? mil  
US$? mil    
<US$ mil   
MNE Entrepreneurial Institutional Multilateral
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
Multilateral institutions turned out to be the source of one of 
the largest FDI inflows to Ukraine. Other institutional inves?
tors, especially private investment funds, also emerged as a 
source of significant direct investment transactions. All the 
funds sampled have sizes of double?, sometimes triple?digit 
million US dollars. In the group of MNEs, those with invest?
ments of less than US$ million fall in the category of “po?
tential investors”, as they have yet to commit significant funds 
into full?blown Ukrainian operations (beyond opening a rep?
resentative office and build?out of distribution networks). 
Nevertheless, more than half of the sampled MNEs have al?
ready committed/invested amounts within the US$– 
million range. 
Looking at FDI in terms of contribution types, our expecta?
tion that institutional investors (institutional and multilat?
eral) prefer cash investments to investments in kind turned 
                                                                                                                        
invest in Ukraine, provided there was a better investment climate 
or/and privatisation effort (e.g., energy sector, hotels, retailing). 
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out to be true: % or more of their investments were made 
in cash form. This is a natural implication of their role as fi?
nancial intermediaries. By contrast, MNEs and entrepreneu?
rial firms rely more on investments in kind: over % of the 
MNEs and % of entrepreneurial firms. Being specialists 
within their sectors, these kinds of investors try to replicate 
locally their operational standards developed elsewhere, by 
importing their standard equipment and technology.  
Investment Makeup by Investor Group 
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
MNE Entrepreneurial Institutional Multilateral
In kind
Cash
 
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
The chart below displays the breakdown of sampled compa?
nies by “mode of entry”. Four types of entry structure were 
identified: 
. Green?field project/start?up; 
. Acquisition of existing local businesses: 
• through privatisation of a state?owned enter?
prise; 
• through acquisition of a privatised enterprise; 
• through acquisition of a private start?up. 
We found that most foreign investors sampled entered 
Ukraine via green?field projects: % of entrepreneurial in?
vestors, % of MNEs, and over % of institutional inves?
tors. Acquisitions via privatisation offerings were found to be 
rare among MNEs and entrepreneurs, and non?existent for 
institutional and multilateral investors. Private start?up com?
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panies also figure very rarely in acquisitions, as few of them 
have yet grown into attractive acquisition targets. However, 
privatised (formerly state?owned) enterprises were more fre?
quently found to be acquisition targets (presumably due to 
their lack of capital for expansion). 
Distribution of Sampled Companies  
by Mode of Entry 
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
Acquisition of start?up   
Acquisition of privatised firm     
Acquisition via privatisation   
Green?field     
MNE Entrepreneurial Institutional Multilateral
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
Survey Findings 
Motivation Profile of Foreign Investors  
in Ukraine 
We started our analysis of foreign investors’ attitudes in 
Ukraine by distinguishing among the three main types of 
strategic motivation for investment projects in Ukraine, 
namely () market?seeking, () resource?seeking, and () effi?
ciency?seeking. The answers given by the firms participating 
in the survey indicate that market?seeking is the dominant 
objective for foreign investment in Ukraine; in fact, it was the 
major motive for % of all respondents, with efficiency? and 
resource?seeking motivations of not more than secondary 
significance. 
The firms’ motives were ranked in order of their importance 
for the investment decision. Average response (AR), which 
demonstrates a degree of importance of a particular reason, 
Market0seeking is the 
dominant objective for 
foreign investment in 
Ukraine, with efficiency0 
and resource0seeking mo0
tivations of not more 
than secondary signifi0
cance. 
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was calculated for each of the motives under consideration as 
the arithmetic mean of respondents' replies. The interview?
ees chose among  grades ranging from "major reason"=; 
"minor reason"=; "not have a reason"=. Therefore, the 
closer the degree of importance is to , the more important is 
the corresponding motive. 
Motives for Companies Investing in Ukraine 
Rank Average Response 
 
Why did you choose  
to invest in Ukraine? 
MNE Entre?
pren. 
Institut. Multilat. Total 
 
Market size and potential 
for market growth . . . . . 
 
Access to a new regional 
(Central/Eastern Europe, 
CIS) market . . . . . 
 
The skill quality of produc?
tion labour . . . . . 
 
Availability of low?cost input 
factors (e.g., cheap labour; 
energy; raw materials) . . . . . 
 Production capacities . . . . . 
 
To improve competitiveness 
in supplying established 
markets (e.g., Western 
Europe) . . . . . 
 Tax incentives . . . . . 
 
A chance to access research 
and technological expertise 
available in Ukraine . . . . . 
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
Ranking of Motives 
Market seeking emerges as the most common strategic motiva?
tion for investment in Ukraine. Only in one case was the ex?
tension of sales to the Ukrainian market seen as a secondary 
objective. The desire to supply the Ukrainian market domi?
nates over other reasons (AR=., making it a major motive 
for % of respondents) while the next important reason, 
i.e., access to a new regional (CEE/CIS) market, has an AR of 
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only .. Average resource? and efficiency?seeking activities 
have AR values of only . and ., respectively, which 
shows that they are only secondary motives, and were fre?
quently regarded as being irrelevant to the decision. 
Evaluation of Investment Motives in Ukraine 
Rank Motive Average Response 
 Market seeking . 
 Resource seeking . 
 Efficiency seeking . 
Source: Flemings/SARS survey 
Resource0seeking motives are the next most important and in?
clude the skill quality of labour (AR=.) and the availability 
of low?cost inputs (AR=.). However, the AR figures show 
that the skill quality of production labour is treated as a mi?
nor reason by most investors (even skewed towards “no rea?
son”): only for % of respondents was skill quality of pri?
mary importance, while for % it was of no importance. 
Similarly, the easy availability of low?cost labour was consid?
ered as an important reason by only % of respondents. It is 
remarkable that % of interviewees considered cheap inputs 
to have had no importance at all in their investment deci?
sions. 
With respect to the relative significance of existing production 
capacities to foreign investors’ decision?making process, the 
high AR of . shows that foreign investors are hardly at?
tracted by available production capacities in Ukraine. It 
seems that the attractions of even some of the more modern 
production facilities operating in Ukraine are cancelled out 
by the deficiencies of Ukraine’s privatisation process, which 
so far has made it difficult for investors to participate on an 
equal footing. 
The remaining three motives (to improve competitiveness in 
supplying established markets, tax incentives, and a chance 
to access particular research and technological expertise 
available in Ukraine) are ranked as comparatively unimpor?
tant. A surprising feature is the unimportance of tax incen?
tives to investment decisions. Although a country’s tax policy 
is usually considered an important decision?factor for foreign 
investors, in Ukraine it seems to be less relevant. This may be 
explained by the high variability of Ukraine’s tax system and 
the unreliability of its legal system.  
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The Prevalence of Market0Seeking Activities in Ukraine: 
Results of the German Advisory Group Study 
The evidence of market?seeking prevalence in Ukraine is also 
supported by recent research performed by the German Ad?
visory Group (GAG) in . A sample of  foreign investors 
was chosen and their motives for committing capital to 
Ukraine were examined. The respondents assessed the im?
portance of each particular motive among  grades ranging 
from "very important"(=), "great"(=) and "slight"(=) to "un?
important"(=). 
The results of the GAG report confirm the findings of our 
survey, insofar as they also rank the three sales?oriented mo?
tives as issues of primary concern to FDI providers in 
Ukraine, with the additional motives being of secondary im?
portance. 
Another part of the GAG paper analyses how the importance 
of different motives for investment decisions varies across 
potential recipient countries. The significance of different 
factors responsible for investment decisions is estimated by 
introducing an "overall indicator of significance" (IS), calcu?
lated as the mean of the average scores of all respondents to 
each of the twelve motives investigated in the study. Thus, the 
IS for Ukraine equals: 
ISUkraine= (. + . + . + . + . + . + . + . + 
. + . + . + .)/ = . 
Similarly, ISCEE = .; ISRussia = . and ISCzech Republic = . 
These indicators constitute the criterion to determine which 
factors act as major stimulants for attracting foreign invest?
ment in a particular country. A higher score than the IS for a 
factor means that it is a significant determinant of investment 
in that country (high influence) and a lower score indicates a 
factor that does not play an important role in the decision 
process (low influence). 
                                                                
 Moellers, Felicitas. "Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine ? Experi?
ences Taken from Reality" in Ukraine at the Crossroads: Economic Re0
forms in International Perspective, Physica (Berlin, New York ) 
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Motives for Companies Investing in Ukraine and Some Other
Transition Countries 
Rank Motive Ukraine CEE Russia Czech Rep. 
 Secure potential sales markets . . . . 
 Develop new sales markets . . . . 
 Overcome import barriers . . . . 
 
Secure and cultivate existing 
sales markets . . . . 
 
Enhance competitiveness 
through primary production 
in the host country . . . . 
 Lower labour costs . . . . 
 Lower tax burden . . . . 
 
Better purchasing and pro?
curement possibilities . . . . 
 Longer working hours . . . . 
 
Fewer administrative im?
pediments . . . . 
 
Longer machine running 
times .. . . . 
 
Less stringent environmental 
constraints . . . . 
Source: Mollers, () "Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine 00 Experiences Taken from Reality" 
The GAG paper demonstrates the differences in the signifi?
cance of twelve decision?factors among countries using the 
following matrix. On the vertical axis the matrix lists the 
twelve prospective influences, according to the scores ob?
tained in the survey. On the horizontal dimension it lists the 
four countries under consideration. The vertical axis is di?
vided into high?influence and low?influence on the decision?
making process, with the break point between these two at 
country?specific IS. 
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Matrix Positioning of FDI Determinants 
in Transitional Countries 
 Ukraine CEE Russia Czech Republic 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
high 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
IS 
 
Secure potential 
sales markets  
Develop new sales 
markets 
Overcome import 
barriers 
Secure and culti?
vate existing sales 
markets 
Enhance competi?
tiveness through 
primary produc?
tion in the host 
country 
 
 
 
. 
 
Develop new sales 
markets 
Secure potential 
sales markets 
Lower labour costs 
Secure and culti?
vate existing sales 
markets 
Enhance competi?
tiveness through 
primary produc?
tion in the host 
country 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Secure and culti?
vate existing sales 
markets 
Secure potential 
sales markets 
Develop new sales 
markets 
Lower labour costs 
Enhance competi?
tiveness through 
primary produc?
tion in the host 
country 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Lower labour costs 
Develop new sales 
markets 
Enhance competi?
tiveness through 
primary produc?
tion in the host 
country 
Secure potential 
sales markets 
Secure and culti?
vate existing sales 
markets 
Longer machine 
running times 
Longer working 
hours 
. 
. 
 
low 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
. 
Lower labour costs 
Lower tax burden 
Better purchasing 
and procurement 
possibilities 
Longer working 
hours 
Fewer administra?
tive impediments 
Longer machine 
running times 
Less stringent envi?
ronmental con?
straints 
Lower tax burden 
Longer working 
hours 
Overcome import 
barriers 
Better purchasing 
and procurement 
possibilities 
Longer machine 
running times 
Fewer administra?
tive impediments 
Less stringent envi?
ronmental con?
straints 
Fewer administra?
tive impediments 
Overcome import 
barriers 
Lower tax burden 
Better purchasing 
and procurement 
possibilities 
Longer working 
hours 
Longer machine 
running times 
Less stringent envi?
ronmental con?
straints 
Lower tax burden 
Better purchasing 
and procurement 
possibilities 
Fewer administra?
tive impediments 
Overcome import 
barriers 
Less stringent envi?
ronmental con?
straints 
Source: Mollers, "Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine— 
Experiences Taken from Reality" () 
The GAG study uses the matrix to discuss how the set of loca?
tion advantages differs across countries. From the investor's 
point of view, Ukraine exhibits a similar profile as Russia, 
where market?seeking activities dominate. However, across all 
CEE countries, lower labour costs turn out to be ranked 
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third, because the sample now includes countries which are 
more successful in market reforms than Ukraine. What is 
more, in the case of the Czech Republic, where reforms are 
already at a very advanced stage, low labour costs become the 
key motive, even though they are considerably higher than in 
Ukraine. Thus, if investors perceive the Czech Republic as 
exhibiting a labour cost advantage, then it is even more evi?
dent that impediments to raising productivity in Ukraine sig?
nificant outweigh the cheap nominal cost of labour. 
This claim is also supported by the study's ranking of "en?
hancing competitiveness through primary production" as 
almost as important a motive for relocation to the Czech Re?
public as market?related motives. However, for Ukraine and 
Russia this aspect is of no more than secondary importance, 
though, again, labour costs are lower than in the Czech Re?
public. 
Type0Specific Peculiarities 
Looking at the survey results from the point of view of type?
specific peculiarities, some striking differences appear in the 
attitudes of different investor types. The relative importance 
of the ready availability of cheap input factors, including la?
bour, is much higher for entrepreneurial than for other 
groups of investors. For entrepreneurial investors, cheap in?
puts rank second in importance (AR=.), being surpassed 
only by market size and its potential growth. This may be ex?
plained by the fact that entrepreneurs, being small/medium?
size investors, are highly sensitive to cost factors. It also shows 
that entrepreneurial investments are typically one?country 
ventures, and as such are not part of a larger strategy. Entre?
preneurs, therefore, usually disregard other market consid?
erations (e.g., regional markets, etc.). 
It is also interesting to note that the importance of improving 
competitiveness in supplying established markets from lower?
cost originations is much higher for MNEs (.) than for the 
sample as a whole (.). It is explained by the MNEs’ ten?
dency to try to raise the efficiency of their operations through 
production in the most cost?efficient place and subsequent 
export to other markets. 
Ukraine’s Cheap Labour: A Myth? 
The fact that cheap labour was not found to be a prominent 
motive for investing in Ukraine deserves more attention, as 
Ukraine’s attraction in this regard is a common theme in de?
scribing Ukraine’s merit as an FDI recipient. It shows that we 
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need to distinguish between nominal wage levels and total 
labour costs, which also take into account labour productiv?
ity, cost of regulatory interventions, and other factors. 
The impact of low labour productivity is clear. Due to a lack 
of capital, necessary training, and inferior management, la?
bour productivity in Ukraine is often so low that total labour 
costs end up higher than in other Eastern European coun?
tries. However, some careful distinctions need to be drawn in 
this regard, as labour productivity seems to differ drastically 
between () situations in which foreign investors acquire ex?
isting factories burdened with huge stocks of unused capital 
and labour, and () situations in which foreign investors 
build new factories, supply modern equipment, and train 
workers. 
Since new owners cannot quickly lay off or re?train several 
thousand people simultaneously, labour productivity tends to 
be much lower in acquisition situations. Local authorities, 
concerned with maintaining employment levels, usually put 
constraints on headcount cuts, thus drastically raising total 
labour costs. In addition, foreign investors are also some?
times obliged to inherit the social infrastructure of large in?
dustrial complexes; including hospitals, kindergartens, 
summer camps, farms, greenhouses etc. 
These obstacles erode the cost advantage of cheaper labour 
by making production more difficult and expensive. How?
ever, where foreign investors build operations from scratch, 
Ukrainian workers often perform no worse than their West?
ern counterparts.  
Risk versus Reward in Ukraine 
The driving force of any investment is the expectation of the 
resulting financial rewards. The expectation of rewards is di?
rectly proportional to the anticipated risks of the investment 
project, i.e., the riskier the project, the higher the required 
return needs to be.  
From the target point of view, the risk profile of a project can 
be broken down into country?specific risk, sector?specific risk 
and project?specific risk. The country risk is the base risk 
component. Unfortunately, in most recent risk ratings, 
Ukraine stands out as one of the most risky countries in the 
CEE region, meaning that investors should anticipate a high 
probability of failure. 
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Country Risk: Composite ICRG Risk Rating 










Russia Romania Ukraine Czech R. Hungary Slovakia Poland
Note: Composite International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk rating is 
an overall index, ranging from  to , based on  components of risk. 
The closer the index approaches , the lower the country risk is. 
Source: The World Bank,   
From the investor’s point of view, their cost of capital defines 
the threshold level of return. Projects with a return below the 
threshold would be value?destroying. In order to maximize 
shareholders’ value, investors would normally pursue pro?
jects, which promise a higher return than their cost of capital. 
The required return needs to incorporate the anticipated 
risk premium of the project (as discussed above). A company 
which enjoys a relatively low cost of capital, will therefore 
typically require a lower return on its investments than one 
with a higher cost of capital. Since a company’s cost of capital 
ultimately depends on a firm’s ability to raise capital by 
means of debt and/or equity, companies with easy access to 
capital will require lower returns on their investment projects 
than companies with less easy access to capital. One may 
therefore expect that global multinationals, typically well?
capitalised companies, would be satisfied with lower ex?
pected returns than local investment funds or entrepreneu?
rial ventures. 
This expectation is supported by the survey results. One ques?
tion in the survey questionnaire asked investors to state the 
internal rate of return (the discount rate that turns the pro?
ject’s cash flows into zero net present value) they would ex?
pect from an investment project in Ukraine. The surveyed 
Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine 
Policy Studies, June  
were asked to choose among the following IRR ranges (de?
fined in constant US$ terms): <%, –%, –%, >%. 
Expected IRR of Investors 
%
IRR 
(real 
US$) 
MNEs Entre?
preneu?
rial 
Institu?
tional 
Multilat?
eral 
TOTAL 
<      
–      
–      
>      
Note: some investors have targeted more than one IRR range
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
As can be seen from the table above, only MNEs and multilat?
erals can afford IRRs of less than % owing to their prime 
creditworthiness, which allows them to keep their cost of 
capital at single?digit levels. Most of them target IRRs of ?
%, which is modest considering Ukraine’s high country 
risk. As expected, entrepreneurs and investment funds re?
quire higher returns: % of entrepreneurial investors and 
% of institutional respondents target IRRs of –%. % 
of institutional investors and % of entrepreneurial inves?
tors require more than % IRR, versus only % of MNEs. 
Across all investor types, the vast majority of respondents 
(some %) required IRRs within the –% range. Judging 
by their risk appetite, multilaterals appear to be the most re?
silient investors, followed by MNEs, while institutional and 
entrepreneurial investors are more risk?averse. 
Investors’ Decision0Making Process: Time 
Horizon and Complexity 
Owing to their differences in size and organisational struc?
ture, different investor types exhibit dissimilar decision?
making patterns. When asked about the typical time period 
for an investment decision (from the moment when a specific 
investment opportunity is identified to the final decision) 
and the number of decision makers involved, our investor 
sample gave the following answers. 
The vast majority of re0
spondents (some %) 
required IRRs within the 
–% range. Judging 
by their risk appetite, 
multilaterals appear to be 
the most resilient inves0
tors, followed by MNEs, 
while institutional and 
entrepreneurial investors 
are more risk0averse. 
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Decision0Making Period and Number  
of Decision0Makers 
%
Time period MNEs Entre?
pren. 
Institu?
tional 
Multi?
laterals 
Total 
Less than 
month      
– months      
– months      
More than  
months      
Avg # of deci?
sionmakers    Board  
Note: some investors have checked more than one time period 
Source: Flemings/SARS survey 
The table shows that even for entrepreneurial investors, the 
decision?making period for an investment in Ukraine takes 
more than  months. Only a few entrepreneurial investors 
can decide on an investment in less than a month. Over half 
of the survey respondents can commit to a direct investment 
within  months. 
The results of the survey confirm our intuitive assumptions. 
Large (hence organisationally complicated) multinationals 
tend to be less flexible and take more time in identifying, de?
veloping and approving investment projects. MNEs, as well as 
institutional investors (multilaterals included), normally 
would not pursue an investment without a thorough due?
diligence process, which may take from one to several 
months. By contrast, private entrepreneurs can make invest?
ment decisions without consulting internal hierarchical 
structures, and without complete information on the invest?
ment project. Therefore, they can make investment decisions 
in a shorter time period than large multinationals or invest?
ment funds. 
Investment funds, which typically have local representation 
in Ukraine, spend their time only on the project specific re?
search and due diligence. They are already aware of the local 
environment. As a consequence, they have a shorter decision?
making period than newly entering MNEs and entrepreneu?
rial investors. At the same time, the involvement of a larger 
The decision0making 
period for an investment 
in Ukraine takes more 
than  months. Few en0
trepreneurial investors 
can decide on an invest0
ment in less than a 
month. 
Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine 
Policy Studies, June  
number of decision?makers makes it difficult for institutional 
investors to come up with a decision in less than  months.  
Multilateral donor organisations have the longest investment 
horizon, since their investment decisions are taken not only 
in a commercial but also in a political context. Their invest?
ment decisions are often largely dependent on policies estab?
lished by local governments. If these policies are in line with 
multilaterals’ preferences, then investment decisions will be 
approved. Otherwise, they can be postponed indefinitely or 
cancelled altogether. Multinationals also typically have a far 
more complicated organisational structure, and their proce?
dures are more rigid; therefore, their decisions demand 
more time. 
Deterrents to FDI in Ukraine 
Given its importance, a question in the survey asked foreign 
direct investors already fully operational in the Ukrainian 
economy to identify and evaluate the main problems encoun?
tered by them in making and operating investments in 
Ukraine. An overview of their answers is given below: 
Impediments to Investment in Ukraine 
Rank  Obstacles to Investment Average Response 
  MNEs Entre?
pren. 
Institu?
tion. 
Multilat. Total 
 
Instability and exorbitance of the 
regulatory environment . . . . . 
 Ambiguity of the legal system . . . . . 
 
Uncertainty of the economic  
environment . . . . . 
 Corruption . . . . . 
 High tax burden . . . . . 
 
Problems establishing clear  
ownership conditions . . . . . 
 Depressed disposable income levels . . . . . 
 
Difficulty of negotiating with govern?
ment/privatisation authorities . . . . . 
 Volatility of the political environment . . . . . 
 Lack of physical infrastructure . . . . . 
 
Problems in accessing domestic and 
export markets . . . . . 
Note:  = ‘major problem’;  = ‘minor problem’;  = ‘not a problem’. Source: Flemings/SARS survey’
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Strikingly, all of the typical obstacles to FDI identified in the 
literature are found in Ukraine and are considered signifi?
cant by foreign direct investors. Even the one found least im?
portant, i.e., “Problems in accessing domestic and export 
markets”, has an AR in Ukraine of .. This indicates that it 
is still found to be an impediment, though of relatively minor 
significance compared to the others.  
The survey showed “Instability and exorbitance of the regula?
tory environment” as the # deterrent, followed by “ambigu?
ity of the legal system”, “uncertainty of the economic envi?
ronment” and “corruption”. It is worth noting that, unlike 
other investor groups, entrepreneurial investors ascribed a 
lower significance to these factors. This may be explained by 
their greater ability to adapt to local business standards.  
“High tax burden” ranks next on the list of Ukrainian disad?
vantages. “Problems associated with establishing clear owner?
ship conditions”, “depressed disposable income levels” and 
“difficulty negotiating with government/privatisation au?
thorities” are also seen as impediments by investors, though 
they are less significant for private and institutional investors. 
At the same time, problems with establishing clear ownership 
conditions are of relatively higher significance for entrepre?
neurial investors (AR=.), presumably because smaller in?
vestors are more vulnerable to the kind of uncertainties 
which unclear ownership conditions may evoke. 
“Volatility of the political environment”, “lack of physical in?
frastructure”, and “problems in accessing domestic and ex?
port markets” conclude the list, with ‘minor problem’ ranks. 
Market access again turned out to be a bigger problem for 
investors directly involved in production activity (i.e., MNEs 
and entrepreneurial) while political instability is of more 
concern for MNEs and multilateral financial institutions. 
Interesting to note that investors ranked problems associated 
with exporting their products to potential new markets as of 
minor significance, not because of the scarcity of impedi?
ments to exports in Ukraine. This is rather due to the lack of 
export?oriented activities, which are typical for resource?
                                                                
 This finding is also supported by evidence from a recent study 
conducted under the aegis of Ukrels and entitled “Enterprise Land 
Privatisation: Appraising the Impact on FDI in Ukraine”. The study, 
which is also found in this issue of POLICY STUDIES, states that en?
trepreneurial investors are the most sensitive to the status of land 
privatisation in Ukraine.  
 
The survey showed insta0
bility and exorbitance of 
the regulatory environ0
ment as the # deterrent 
to FDI, followed by ambi0
guity of the legal system, 
uncertainty of the eco0
nomic environment, and 
corruption. 
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seeking and efficiency?seeking investment. Again, this finding 
indirectly confirms the prevalence of market?seeking invest?
ment activities in Ukraine.  
In what follows, we give more detailed explanations of the 
impediments to FDI in Ukraine. 
Taxation 
Punitive and unpredictable taxation is often seen as a sub?
stantial impediment to doing business in Ukraine. Although 
taxes in Ukraine currently take the usual forms of corporate, 
personal, and VAT taxes, the levels of these taxes are exces?
sive; for example, the business payroll stands at over  per?
cent. To make things worse, exemptions are applied in an 
arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. Tax avoidance is wide?
spread, as are the bribery and corruption associated with tax 
avoidance. The underground, “shadow” economy has mush?
roomed from about % of economic activity prior to inde?
pendence to more than % now. By definition, none of this 
informal activity is taxed. 
A costly side?effect of the shrinking tax base is that private 
enterprises (not to mention individuals) avoid the banking 
system, since bank deposits would expose them to tax collec?
tion. In Ukraine, the broadly defined money supply, M, is 
only % of GDP. This constitutes only a fraction of the levels 
of any but the world's least developed economies. This means 
that Ukraine is effectively a cash and barter economy, with all 
the usual costly consequences for doing business. Another 
consequence of tax avoidance is that firms are biased toward 
inefficiently high capital expenditures in an effort to mini?
mise reported profits.  
Foreign investors cannot expect to evade taxes alongside the 
underground local enterprises. On the contrary, foreign in?
vestors are typically treated as highly visible and vulnerable 
cash cows. They can expect to pay not only legitimate, pre?
announced taxes, but also ad hoc assessments and bribes that 
depend on the power of particular government officials to 
block their activities. This is a part of a wider pattern of gov?
ernment interference. 
Government Interference 
Ukrainian managers spend a significant amount of time deal?
ing with government officials regarding taxation, licensing, 
and related matters. Private firms spend more time on this 
than do state?owned enterprises. Projects sponsored by inter?
national financial institutions are not immune to government 
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interference. For example, we were told that an EBRD?
financed agricultural services project has been subject to  
external tax audits in the last  months. Real estate devel?
opment can be particularly difficult; in Kyiv, it can take two 
years from the first application to the receipt of formal ap?
proval. Applications by both Hilton and Marriott hotels re?
main on hold, while hotel facilities in Kyiv remain inade?
quate. Obstacles arise from a plethora of agencies, including 
tax authorities, the customs service, the ministries of finance, 
and economy, and local authorities. 
Changing Laws 
In the absence of a new Civil Code, existing legal ambiguity is 
compounded by the uncertain precedence of one enactment 
over another. A common problem is that licensing and regu?
latory requirements are not only unclear at the outset of a 
project, they also invariably change and multiply as project 
development proceeds. Even worse, new regulations are of?
ten applied retroactively, thus significantly raising investment 
risks. 
Customs 
Most complaints against the customs clearance procedure 
refer to the legal uncertainties surrounding it. New regula?
tions not yet published, or published only the previous day, 
are immediately put into practice by the customs authorities. 
In many cases, this leads to delays lasting several days, making 
deliveries headed for Western Europe less and less attractive 
to customers, and causing costly idle times for companies in 
Ukraine waiting for consignments of spare parts, etc. The list 
of goods subject to customs duty is constantly altered, making 
every delivery a matter of luck—have all the papers been ob?
tained or does some confirmation or other still have to be 
taken to the border, as so frequently happens?  
The customs authorities' arbitrary behaviour seriously im?
pacts the investment climate in Ukraine. There is evidence of 
a number of cases which resemble the following one: after an 
investor had imported his basic product from abroad without 
having to pay customs duties for ten months, the country in 
question was suddenly put on the list of countries from which 
imports were liable for duties. 
Corruption, Crime, and Unenforceable Contracts 
Corruption follows directly from the degree of discretion 
officials have in granting approvals for private business. In 
Ukraine, unofficial payments have to be made at all stages of 
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the licensing and permission process. Once again, it is local 
officials who are particularly notorious for extracting bribes, 
often to waive regulations that have already been abolished 
by the central government.  
Policy Agenda to Enhance Ukraine’s 
Attractiveness for FDI 
Given the numerous concerns voiced by foreign investors 
over the deterrents to FDI in Ukraine, we felt it useful to ask 
investors to provide their views on the policy agenda for the 
Ukrainian government. For this purpose a section of the 
questionnaire included questions about what should be done 
by the Ukrainian government to improve Ukraine’s attrac?
tiveness for FDI. 
The table below summarises the responses received. The 
numbers in the table represent average scores (from “—a top 
priority” to “—not a priority”), assigning relative significance 
to certain policy moves. 
What Should Be Done to Enhance Attractiveness of Ukraine  
for Foreign Investors? 
 Policy actions MNEs Entre?
preneu?
rial 
Institu?
tional 
Multi?
lateral 
Total 
 
Liberalise capital, forex and profit re?
patriation controls . . .  . 
 
Lift restrictions on foreign ownership 
and control . . .  . 
 Minimise red tape .  .  . 
 
Reduce tax rates and in number of 
taxes .  .  . 
 
Lift restrictions in accessing domestic 
and export markets . . .  . 
 
Enhance the contract enforcement sys?
tem . .   . 
 
Equalise domestic and foreign investors 
in treatment by the Ukrainian govern?
ment  . .  . 
 Improve physical infrastructure . . . . . 
 Increase trade barriers for imports . . . . . 
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
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As can be seen from the aggregated responses, the liberalisa?
tion of capital, foreign exchange and profit repatriation con?
trols; the lifting of restrictions on foreign ownership and con?
trol; and minimisation of red tape and reduction in tax rates 
and in the overall number of taxes are considered to be pri?
mary actions which should be undertaken by the govern?
ment. All types of investors are virtually unanimous in rank?
ing these issues. Only small discrepancies arise between the 
MNEs and other groups of investors in ranking the various 
issues. Whilst the MNEs give priority to liberalisation of capi?
tal, forex and profit repatriation controls, and lifting of re?
strictions on foreign ownership and control, other groups 
(both institutional and entrepreneurial) are more preoccu?
pied with the minimisation of red tape, reduction in tax 
rates, and in the number of taxes. This difference can proba?
bly be attributed to superior MNEs bargaining power over 
entrepreneurial and private institutional investors. 
Being directly involved in production and distribution activi?
ties, MNEs and entrepreneurs both expressed concern over 
market access, as they are often constrained in their sales de?
cisions. 
It was surprising to find that such frequently cited FDI incen?
tives as equal treatment of foreign investors, enhancement of 
infrastructure, and increase in import barriers are perceived 
to have relatively low priority for Ukraine’s policy agenda. 
Within this low priority group, multilaterals and MNEs attach 
more importance to infrastructure?improving policies. En?
trepreneurial investors, who have limited capability to pro?
tect their rights, attach more importance to equalisation of 
rights. 
Role of Privatisation in Attracting  
and Sustaining FDI 
Since the status of privatisation was found to be an important 
factor in attracting FDI flows to countries in transition, the 
questionnaire asked about its perceived importance in 
Ukraine. As anticipated, the status of privatisation was found 
to be significant in the overwhelming majority of cases. Only 
% of the respondents (deep?pocketed MNEs) found privati?
sation status to be unimportant in their activity. For the rest 
of the investors (%), privatisation policy appears to be a 
crucial factor, which affects their investment decisions (see 
table below). 
The liberalisation of 
capital, foreign exchange 
and profit repatriation 
controls; the lifting of 
restrictions on foreign 
ownership and control; 
and minimisation of red 
tape and reduction in tax 
rates and in the overall 
number of taxes are 
considered to be primary 
actions which would be 
undertaken by the 
Ukrainian government. 
All types of investors are 
virtually unanimous in 
ranking these issues. 
The status of privatisa0
tion was found to be sig0
nificant in the over0
whelming majority of 
cases. Only % of re0
spondents found the pri0
vatisation status unim0
portant in their activity. 
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Significance of Privatisation Status for Investment Decisions 
%
Significance  MNE Entrepr. Institutional Multilateral Total 
Very significant      
Significant      
Insignificant      
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
Privatisation is generally perceived as benefiting the national 
economy and local business in various ways: through en?
hancement of productivity, reduction of unproductive gov?
ernment interference in the economy, etc. Foreign investors 
who participated in the survey were asked to describe how 
privatisation would benefit their investment policies in 
Ukraine. The table below summarises their replies. 
Perception of Benefits from Privatisation 
%
Benefits from privatisation MNEs Entrepre?
neurial 
Institu?
tional 
Multilat?
eral 
Total 
New acquisition opportunities      
Enhanced business climate      
Note: some investors have checked more than one reason
Source: Flemings/SARS survey  
The importance of privatisation in opening up acquisition 
opportunities was acknowledged by most institutional (pri?
vate and multilateral) and entrepreneurial investors sur?
veyed. It was surprising to compare this result with the previ?
ous findings, which showed that MNEs do not rely much on 
privatisation in structuring their entry. The reason may be 
that either there are not many companies in the privatisation 
pipeline which MNEs would consider worth acquiring or that 
they do not believe that the privatisation process would be 
transparent. 
The majority of respondents see the most important role of 
privatisation in the enhancement of the overall business cli?
mate, given that privatisation favours efficiency. 
Policy Recommendations 
The survey findings imply an array of recommendations for 
Ukraine’s FDI policy. Yet, in order to avoid recommenda?
tions in broad and, therefore, ambiguous terms, we focus on 
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concrete steps the Ukrainian privatisation agency, the State 
Property Fund (SPF), can undertake to facilitate FDI inflow.  
Given that market seeking is a dominant drive of foreign in?
vestors coming to Ukraine, policy should target lower entry 
barriers. Provided a transparent and smooth privatisation 
procedure, as well as availability of suitable acquisition tar?
gets, entry through privatisation offerings (e.g., acquisition of 
majority stakes in target enterprises via tender) should take 
less effort from investors than development and implementa?
tion of green?field projects. In order not to distort this com?
mon sense, the SPF should ideally become the only authority 
to deal with, and the only decision?maker on privatisation 
terms and methods. The recently launched administrative 
reform might help with achieving that end, as a number of 
agencies with overlapping authority were liquidated (e.g., 
National Agency for Management of Corporate Rights). 
Given that most investors need more than  months to come 
up with investment capital, saving time on fixing terms and 
negotiating with privatisation authorities should be worth?
while. In addition, it might be more effective and efficient to 
focus efforts on reducing red tape and containing corruption 
within the SPF rather than disperse efforts in trying to fight 
those problems countrywide and across different government 
levels.  
The transparency of privatisation procedures should also 
make ownership rights clearer. Though it is also a function of 
the broader legal and judicial framework, adoption of sales 
procedures that avoid creating collusion clauses, which may 
be challenged later, should make investors feel more com?
fortable about their ownership titles. Here, the SPF has to 
demonstrate integrity and consistency. The resulting simpli?
fication of dealing with Ukrainian privatisation authorities, 
and greater clarity of ownership status, should translate into 
better bid valuations (owing to lower risks), as well as make 
privatisation offerings accessible to a wider pool of investors. 
The study also implied that prime MNEs, as best?practice 
firms and deep pockets, should be targeted as investors for 
Ukraine, which faces enormous restructuring and investment 
needs and desperately needs revenues for the state coffers. 
MNE modest IRR demands potentially open a wider spec?
trum of enterprises/projects for investment. To tailor the 
SPF’s privatisation policy and methods to MNE preferences, 
we recommend the following: 
Given that market seek0
ing is a dominant drive 
of foreign investors com0
ing to Ukraine, policy 
should target lower entry 
barriers. Having still 
many lucrative enter0
prises in the pipeline, 
Ukrainian privatisation 
has the possibility to tap 
a deep pool of FDI, where 
best0practice foreign firms 
would prevail. 
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• Given the prevalence of market seeking as the driving 
investment motive, the SPF should focus on sectors with 
a sufficiently large and growing domestic market: food 
sector and telecoms.  
• Terms of privatisation sales should avoid constraints on 
staffing levels, since that keeps labour?seeking motives 
out of play. This should apply especially for labour inten?
sive sectors like textiles and apparel, and some sub?
sectors of engineering. 
• Though benefiting from the low cost of capital, the dis?
count rate in valuing Ukrainian targets is highly unlikely 
to fall below % in real US dollar terms. SPF officials 
should learn the basics of the DCF (Discounted Cash 
Flow Analysis) assessment approach to come up with real?
istic offer prices (or alternatively, hire reputable profes?
sionals to do assessments). 
• The SPF should also understand that attachment of in?
vestment commitments to tender terms is irrelevant in 
getting a better price for the offered stake. Frequently, 
those investment requirements are excessive and inap?
propriate (might be value?destroying) since a best?
practice MNE should know better how to spend its 
money effectively and efficiently. In addition, by logic of 
the net present value, those investment commitments re?
duce the price of the stake per se. For the sake of trans?
parency, a privatisation offering where bidders compete 
only on price without facing some fixed investment re?
quirements, should be a preferable option. A firm (most 
likely to be on MNE) which is the most efficient in run?
ning the enterprise to be sold should anticipate the high?
est stream of earnings, and thus should be able to submit 
the highest bid.  
• Given the complexity of MNE decision making, the pri?
vatisation offering should allow enough time for proper 
evaluation of the target firm and due diligence, i.e., it 
should optimally allocate – months.  
• Prior to privatisation offering, the SPF should ideally 
clear the ground from legal, regulatory, and other uncer?
tainties by pressing relevant agencies for the desired 
amendments. Much of the uncertainties would be elimi?
nated if the SPF offers majority stakes (ideally %+), or 
at least allows interested investors to accumulate such a 
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stake (i.e., the stake retained in state ownership should 
not exceed %).  
Foreign investors would certainly evaluate their possible in?
vestments in Ukraine in a broader context, not just according 
to the merits and faults of its privatisation policy. However, 
having still many lucrative enterprises in the pipeline, 
Ukrainian privatisation has the possibility to tap a deep pool 
of FDI, where best?practice foreign firms would prevail.  
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Enterprise Land Privatisation: 
Appraising Its Impact on Foreign 
Direct Investment in Ukraine 
Preface 
This study investigates whether or not land privatisation 
status is a consideration for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
decisions in Ukraine. The analysis also estimates the possible 
benefits of more FDI resulting from progress in privatisation 
of Ukraine’s non?agricultural land. This research was origi?
nated and sponsored by the USAID?funded Ukraine Enter?
prise Land Sales (Ukrels) Project. Ukrels commissioned 
Velox Company, a US?based consulting firm specializing in 
investment research and advisory, marketing, and manage?
ment consulting in Ukraine, to undertake the study and pre?
pare this report. Velox’s research team comprised Vitali 
Nosov, Alina Kudina, and Dmytri Lohvynenko.  
The study is based on a survey conducted by Velox Company 
in November–December , covering  foreign investors 
who entered or sought to enter Ukraine’s market. 
The authors of this report are grateful to all respondents for 
their cooperation and valuable input to this study. Our spe?
cial thanks go to Mr. Johann Boden (Chumak/South Food), 
Mr. Patrick Bracken (Cargill), and Mr. Jack Liczkowski (Best?
foods) for their prompt and thoughtful replies and com?
ments.  
Executive Summary 
Land ownership is never explicitly mentioned as an FDI mo?
tive in the mainstream literature on FDI. Yet the issue of land 
privatisation in transition economies, and Ukraine in particu?
lar, does fit in the orthodox framework of FDI motives, as it 
helps to limit the risks of governmental intervention and po?
litical/regulatory instability. The stylised empirical evidence 
across CEE/CIS, and bottom?up evidence of other studies are 
supportive of a positive link between land tradability and the 
level of FDI in a recipient country. 
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By undertaking a survey of  foreign firms who invested or 
intend to invest in Ukraine, the study attempted to reveal the 
empirical evidence for the following two hypotheses: 
) In a transition economy setting, land tradability, achieved by land 
privatisation, has a positive impact on FDI inflows. The less limited 
land tradability is, the more FDI are going to flow in.  
) When investing in sectors/enterprises where production is more 
land0intensive, foreign investors are going to be more sensitive to land 
tradability/ownership than in case of those with a negligible role of 
land in the production process.  
The survey findings yielded generally supportive results for 
both assumptions. However, the former did not have uni?
form empirical support: the study showed that land status has 
the greatest importance for smaller firms working in a sector 
where land is an important input (either direct or indirect), 
while the significance of land ownership is weaker for global 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), especially when their ac?
tivities are not much related with land. The second hypothe?
sis has found significant support in the survey data, though, 
again, large MNEs appear to be less sensitive to the issue.  
The study also proved that most foreign direct investors in 
Ukraine would vote in favour of land privatisation, anticipat?
ing either direct or indirect enhancement of their business 
climate, while some would also respond with an increase in 
their FDI commitments to Ukraine. In other words, a rigor?
ous effort of the Ukrainian authorities to boost land privatisa?
tion should pay off in higher FDI inflows. 
Introduction 
Since the being of its economic transition, foreigners have 
viewed Ukraine as an unattractive place to invest. In addition 
to excessive regulations, frequently changing legislation, and 
lack of transparency, the stalled issue of land privatisation is 
frequently cited among impediments to foreign direct in?
vestments in Ukraine. The fact that Ukraine, known for its 
fertile soil, has a natural comparative advantage in land?
intensive agriculture and food?processing sectors, which to?
gether make up over % of GDP, makes the issue of land 
privatisation even more acute.  
In this regard, a study was undertaken of the impact of land 
ownership on foreign investors’ decisions to set up their 
business in Ukraine. The study was based on a survey of sen?
ior executives of foreign companies which are either operat?
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ing or represented in Ukraine. While about  companies 
were approached, the final survey sample included  re?
spondents, what is enough to draw general conclusions. 
 The main body of this report includes five chapters. The first 
chapter (‘Ukraine’s Status Quo With FDI and Land Owner?
ship’) reviews Ukraine’s record and patterns in attracting FDI 
and describes the current status of land tradability. The sec?
ond chapter ‘Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses’ pre?
sents theoretical background, and formulates a number of 
testable hypotheses regarding the impact of land privatisation 
status on FDI. The third chapter ‘Data and Survey Methodol?
ogy’ describes the sampling methodology and survey ap?
proach, along with the sample profile. In the fourth chapter 
‘Survey Findings’, the formulated assumptions regarding the 
significance of land privatisation status for non?agricultural 
foreign firms are tested by empirical evidence revealed in the 
survey. The final chapter ‘Conclusions’ summarizes the study 
findings, as well as infers policy implications for Ukraine in 
the realm of enterprise land privatisation.  
Ukraine’s Status Quo with Land 
Ownership 
Before we dwell on the link between land ownership and FDI, 
let us review the current status of Ukraine’s land privatisa?
tion. So far, Ukraine has not developed full tradability of 
land, as a prevailing number of local decision makers regard 
it as a taboo issue. However, over the last year Ukraine has 
exhibited some progress, which resulted in the start of small?
scale privatisation of enterprise land. 
The minimum but sufficient legal justification entitling en?
terprises to privatise their land in use was established by a 
presidential decree issued back in July . However, the 
Land Code adopted in  explicitly allows only for sale of 
farmland under very restrictive, which that made this Decree 
vulnerable to challenges. The situation changed with the 
adoption of the new Constitution (June ), which has a 
clause guaranteeing individuals and enterprises the right to 
own land in accordance with legislation. Coupled with the 
presidential decree, this clause provided enterprises with a 
sufficient legal basis for buying land.  
Nevertheless, until  virtually no privatisation transac?
tions with land took place. In , enterprise land privatisa?
tion became observable, and resulted in sale of over  land 
So far, Ukraine has not 
developed full tradability 
of land, as a prevailing 
number of local decision 
makers regard it as a 
taboo issue. However, 
over the last year Ukraine 
has exhibited some pro0
gress, which resulted in 
the start of small0scale 
privatisation of enter0
prise land. 
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slots valued at some US$ million. As of late November , 
the number of land sales (under the aegis of the Ukrels pro?
ject) reached , raising UAH million (or under US$ 
million). To date, the volume of land sales has not yet re?
sulted in the emergence of a significant secondary market for 
land. 
The process has been recently boosted by a presidential de?
cree “On Sale of Non?agricultural Land Parcels For Entre?
preneurial Activities” (January , ). Specifically, the de?
cree explicitly gives individuals and firms the right to pur?
chase land underneath their enterprises (including unfin?
ished construction sites). The decree also envisages the op?
tion of market or expert assessment of land, as well as an op?
tion of long?term instalment payment, which should facilitate 
land sales.  
Conceptual Framework  
and Hypotheses  
Across the mainstream literature, land privatisation has never 
been mentioned as an issue of consideration for investors 
apart from agriculture, where land is the major production 
input. In the agricultural sector, land tradability is expected 
to create an incentive for higher efficiency (since land will 
have a price tag that would indicate the opportunity cost) and 
productivity (since land can be used as collateral for raising 
financing for agricultural producers).  
So, why should land ownership status be a consideration for 
investors dealing with non?agricultural enterprises, where 
land is not a factor of production? Theoretically, an enter?
prise requires only an exclusive right to use the land slot it 
needs, which does not necessarily imply full ownership of that 
land; a lease arrangement should equally accomplish that 
end. The only strong case in favour of land ownership would 
be one when lease arrangements are proven to be fragile, i.e., 
they provide insecure rights of use. The source of the latter 
can be with one of the contracting parties, more specifically, 
with lessor. In former socialist economies, the state (repre?
sented either by municipalities or the central government) is 
the most frequent lessor, since it is the dominant owner of 
land. Thus, there should be some problems with the 
                                                                
 So far, most land sales in Ukraine have been arranged by the 
USAID?funded Ukrels project.  
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state/government as the lessor, which makes full ownership 
of land (through privatisation) a preferable option for private 
enterprises and investors.  
A recent survey of over , firms in  transition econo?
mies, conducted by the EBRD in collaboration with the 
World Bank and reported in the EBRD Transition Report  
has supported the idea that the state is a poor partner in 
Ukraine. First, Ukraine turned out to be the second?least (af?
ter Moldova) secure economy regarding property and con?
tract rights: over % of surveyed firms reported doubts 
about the security of their contract/property rights. In con?
trast, less than % of surveyed firms in Hungary and Poland 
had similar concerns. This might explain why more certain 
full ownership of land should be a superior option in 
Ukraine. Indeed, to date, a significant share of land privatisa?
tion deals in Ukraine has been made by firms who wish to 
switch from ‘permanent’ lease rights to complete ownership. 
The EBRD survey also revealed that private firms face much 
less frequent state interference than state?owned firms do. 
Ukrainian firms also reported more frequent state interfer?
ence than Polish, Russian, or Romanian ones did. Thus, pri?
vatisation of land reduces the grounds for state interference, 
which frequently has an adverse impact on foreign investors.  
Formulation of Testable Hypotheses 
The stylised empirical evidence (sourced from the EBRD 
Transition Report ) does point to a positive relationship 
between the tradability of land and FDI. The data plot below 
illustrates the point. However, it implies that the relationship 
is not that strong.  
Based on the EBRD data, we opted to group transition 
economies into two categories: the first group comprises the 
countries (Ukraine included) where land is not tradable (de 
jure and/or de facto), and the second group includes coun?
tries where land is tradable (with or without restrictions for 
foreigners). The small sample size ( countries) does not 
allow for a meaningful classification into more than  groups.  
                                                                
 EBRD Transition Report , p.  
 One should be cautious about drawing conclusions from this data 
plot, due to the small number of observations and its oversimplifica?
tion.  
One can formulate the 
following hypotheses: () 
in a transition economy 
setting, land tradability, 
which is achieved by land 
privatisation, has a posi0
tive impact on FDI in0
flows; () for a given 
enterprise or sector, the 
significance of land own0
ership status for FDI 
tends to rise with the sig0
nificance of land as a 
(direct or indirect) factor 
of production/service. 
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 Why Has Kyiv Lacked Luxury Hotels  
for So Long? 
Kyiv has a reputation as the only capital city in Europe that does 
not have a single five0star hotel. The situation might look para0
doxical, since there is sufficient demand for a luxury hotel service 
and there are many projects to build such hotels, backed by respect0
able foreign investors. 
 
Those projects typically rely on long0term leasing of a land parcel 
in Kyiv, and here many problems arise. Firstly, hotel project devel0
opers encounter legal ambiguities regarding who is authorized to be 
a lessee of a land parcel. For example, the stagnant Ukrainian 
legislation may not provide for any definitive allocation of specific 
parcels of land between state and municipal ownership. Before 
that, for an investor it would be impossible to identify whether Kyiv 
State Administration (state ownership) or Kyiv City Council (mu0
nicipal ownership) has the authority to lease a particular parcel of 
land or grant permanent use rights with respect to such land. 
When approval of the right authority is secured, the story only be0
gins. At a preparatory stage, the investor has to secure numerous 
documents from a number of City Administration departments; at 
pre0project stage the project design has to be approved by two local 
agencies; to secure location approval and reserve the site, the inves0
tor has also to submit a number of documents and win a number 
of consents; then the design undergoes revision and requires ap0
proval of over  bodies. After that, the Kyiv City Council adopts a 
decision to grant land use rights, though construction works re0
quire additional permits from a different authority. Rotation of 
mayors and re0elections of city councils can make the process even 
more challenging. 
The cost of a stalemated 0star hotel project typically runs to dozens 
of US$ millions and hundreds of job places, leaving aside the posi0
tive spillover effects for the local economy. Since , the pipeline 
of stalemated hotel projects in Kyiv has exceeded US$ million. 
As the description of the land allocation procedure above implies, 
the excessive red tape and non0transparency of land allocation 
rules are the main reasons for the stalemate. Those distortions 
would not likely exist under full ownership of land by investors 
since full title to a land spot would minimize room for governmen0
tal discretion and interference. 
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Cumulative FDI vs. Land Tradability 
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Land Tradability score 
Source: EBRD Transition Report , Velox Co. 
Note: Land Tradability Score: =de jure limited tradability; =de facto 
limited tradability; =full tradability except foreigners; =full tradability:  
For the first group ( countries), the average FDI stock per 
capita was US$ (here Ukraine, with US$, still lags be?
hind). The other group of  can boast average FDI stock per 
capita as high as US$, or about  times more than that of 
the first group. While the difference in land tradability status 
is unlikely to capture the whole gap in FDI levels between 
these two groups of economies, there are grounds to believe 
that the issue of land ownership has a definite effect.  
Based on this top?down observation, we can formulate the 
first hypothesis:  
In a transition economy setting, land tradability, which is achieved by 
land privatisation, has a positive impact on FDI inflows. The less 
limited land tradability is, the more FDI are going to flow in.  
Continuing the established logic, we can come up with an?
other testable hypothesis:  
For a given enterprise or sector, the significance of land ownership 
status for FDI tends to rise with the significance of land as a (direct or 
indirect) factor of production/service. In other words, when investing 
in sectors/enterprises where production is more land intensive, foreign 
investors are going to be more sensitive to land tradability/ownership 
than in case of those with a negligible role of land in the production 
process.  
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Groupings of CEE/CIS Countries by Land Tradability Status  
De jure limited tradability of land Limited tradability of land 
 FDI stock (–)  FDI stock (–)
 US$ per capita  US$ per capita 
FYR Macedonia   FYR Macedonia  
Azerbaijan   Azerbaijan  
Belarus   Belarus  
Kazakhstan   Kazakhstan  
Russia   Russia  
Uzbekistan   Uzbekistan  
Average   Albania  
   Romania  
De facto limited tradability of land Georgia  
 FDI stock (–)  Kyrgyzstan  
 US$ per capita  Tajikistan  
Albania   Ukraine  
Romania   Average  
Georgia   SD  
Kyrgyzstan    
Tajikistan    
Ukraine    
Average    
    
Full tradability of land (except foreigners) Full tradability of land 
 FDI stock (–)  FDI stock (–)
 US$ per capita  US$ per capita 
Bulgaria   Bulgaria  
Czech Republic   Czech Republic  
Estonia   Estonia  
Hungary    Hungary   
Latvia   Latvia  
Lithuania   Lithuania  
Poland   Poland  
Slovak Republic   Slovak Republic  
Slovenia   Slovenia  
Armenia   Armenia  
Average   Croatia  
   Moldova  
Full tradability of land  Average   
 FDI stock (–)  SD  
 US$ per capita   
Croatia    
Moldova    
Average    
Source: EBRD Transition Report , Velox Co. 
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Data and Survey Methodology 
Survey Approach 
To test the hypotheses formulated above on the Ukrainian 
ground, we designed a survey of foreign investors. The survey 
was conducted by means of mail?out questionnaires and per?
sonal interviews with senior executives of foreign companies.  
While selecting the companies, we tried to form a representa?
tive sample by taking into account type of industry, company 
size, country of origin, and the type of investment. However, 
the sample was deliberately selected with a biased toward 
those industries where land should be a priori important, e.g., 
food processing, catering, real estate/construction. Our 
sampling bias to food processing is also justified by its top 
ranking among Ukraine’s sectors that attracted the largest 
amounts of FDI: this sector accounts for over % of the cu?
mulative FDI in Ukraine. Other sectors of significant FDI 
weight—engineering, chemicals/pharmaceuticals—were also 
represented in the sample. On the other hand, we skipped a 
number of sectors which are significant in volumes of FDI in 
Ukraine—financial/insurance, communications, and some 
others—on the grounds that a priori land is likely to play a 
negligible role in their business.  
We contacted  companies and ended up with  whose re?
sponses formed the basis of our study. The final sample is 
characterized by the following structure: 
Foreign Investors: Survey Participants 
Industry Number of companies 
 Contacted Replied 
 Number % of total Number % of total 
Food/Beverages/Catering     
Chemicals/ Pharmaceuticals     
Engineering      
Real Estate/Construction     
Multisectoral (direct equity funds)     
Other/Miscellaneous     
 
To test the hypotheses 
formulated above on the 
Ukrainian ground, we 
designed a survey of for0
eign investors. The sur0
vey was conducted by 
means of mail0out ques0
tionnaires and personal 
interviews with senior 
executives of foreign com0
panies. While selecting 
the companies we tried to 
form a representative 
sample. We contacted  
companies and ended up 
with  whose responses 
formed the basis of our 
study. 
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Sample Profile 
As of the date of the survey (December ), the firms of the 
survey respondents had invested or committed to invest over 
US$ million what roughly represents one?fourth of the 
total FDI stock in Ukraine. In terms of country of origin, US 
firms prevail, which is consistent with statistics that indicates 
the USA as the # country of origin for FDI in Ukraine.  
Geographic Distribution of Sampled Companies 










US Netherlands Germany Multicountry Others (
countries)
Our resulting sample is quite balanced between prospective 
and invested or committed investors, as well as between 
MNEs and entrepreneurial/other types of companies (ex?
cept entrepreneurial types of firms among prospective inves?
tors).  
Distribution of Sampled Companies by Type 













Prospective Invested/Committed
MNE
Entrepreneurial/Other
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In terms of investment amounts, the sample seems to be rep?
resentative across a wide spectrum of deals, though with a 
greater emphasis on small and medium investment sizes, 
which account for the majority of FDI inflows in Ukraine.  
Distribution of Companies by Investment Size 












Below US$ m US$– m US$– m US$– m Over US$ m  
As mentioned above, the sample was intentionally designed 
to have high weights for sectors where land is assumed to be 
important, i.e., food?related, real estate/construction. Such 
enterprises account for more than half of the final sample. 
One clarification is also in order here: Under the ‘Multisec?
toral’ category, we also incorporated two institutional inves?
tors who make direct equity investments into local enter?
prises from a diversity of sectors.  
Distribution of Sampled Companies by Sector 



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Survey Findings 
Where is Land Important? 
The majority of survey respondents ( out of ) acknowl?
edged the importance of land in their business. As antici?
pated, food?related industries and real estate/construction 
indicated the importance of land in their business activity. It 
appeared that land bears some importance for pharmaceuti?
cals and chemicals, as the former needs space for storage and 
retail outlets, while the latter can be interested in land if it 
contains a deposit of raw materials. Quite predictably, firms 
having higher involvement in agriculture (e.g., Cargill, Kyiv 
Atlantic, Chumak) give top importance to the role of land. 
Is Land an Important Input in Your Business 
Activity? 
Very Important
%
Slightly 
Important
%
Important
%
No
%
Survey Participants 
# of respondents
Investor types/  
Sectors 
Land?
intensive 
Other Total 
 MNEs    
 Entrepreneurial/ other    
 Invested/committed    
 Prospective    
The majority of survey 
respondents acknowl0
edged the importance of 
land in their business. As 
anticipated, food0related 
industries and real es0
tate/construction indi0
cated the importance of 
land in their business 
activity. 
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To get a more meaningful idea about the survey findings, we 
attempted to identify patterns within our sample by grouping 
the respondents by investor type (multinational vs. entrepre?
neurial/other and invested vs. prospective) and sector (land 
intensive that includes food, agri, catering, beverages, real 
estate, and construction versus industries with low relevance 
of land as an input, e.g., engineering, chemicals, pharmaceu?
ticals). Though numbers within groups are rather small to 
draw strong conclusions, we nevertheless proceed with this 
matrix.  
Looking through this matrix, one might notice that within 
those  firms which admitted the importance of land for 
their business the majority is concentrated in land?intensive 
sectors. Horizontally, MNEs tend to ascribe smaller weight to 
the importance of land vis?а?vis entrepreneurial firms. This is 
probably due to the difference in bargaining power of a 
global multinational and a small entrepreneurial venture. In 
addition, land appeared to be a bit more important for 
committed investors vs. prospective ones. Here, we are reluc?
tant to draw any conclusions, due to an asymmetry between 
these  groups: the group of prospective investors had none 
of the non?MNE types of firms. This bias in our sample might 
explain this difference. 
Survey Respondents for whom Land is Important 
percentage of respondents within groups
Investor types/  
Sectors 
Land in?
tensive 
Other Average 
 MNEs    
 Entrepreneurial/ other    
 Invested/committed    
 Prospective    
Willingness to Buy Land into Full Ownership 
With respect to current land ownership status, the long?term 
lease turned out to be a prevailing form of land use for % 
of survey respondents. Three firms managed to secure full 
ownership of their land plots. Those which fall under short?
term lease and other arrangements are mostly prospective 
investors who have not yet moved beyond establishing a rep 
office.  
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The survey respondents reported to be using in total over 
, hectares of land (not everyone reported), with few of 
them having a plan to buy it all into full ownership. Firms 
that depend on the performance of Ukraine’s agriculture, 
e.g., food/agri processors, presented the strongest case for 
purchase of land. Some firms conditioned their wish to buy 
land on pricing (e.g., real estate/construction firms, direct 
equity funds). Overall,  out of  respondents reported their 
willingness to purchase land (over , hectares in total). 
Among the  surveyed firms, the strongest preference for 
complete land ownership was expressed by smaller entrepre?
neurial firms ( out of ), while only  out of  MNEs indi?
cated this preference. Predictably, firms in land?intensive 
sectors also exhibited greater willingness to purchase their 
land into full ownership. Again, firms which already have 
launched their business in Ukraine were more willing to buy 
their land plots (but keep in mind our sampling bias).  
 Distribution of Sampled Companies by Land  
Ownership Status 















Fully owned Long term lease Short?term lease Other   
Respondents Who Preferred Full Land Ownership 
percentage of respondents within groups
Investor types/  
Sectors 
Land?
intensive Other Average 
 MNEs    
 Entrepreneurial/ other    
 Invested/committed    
 Prospective    
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 South Foods/Chumak: A Successful Strategy 
(Based on the questionnaire) 
The Ukrainian business of Swedish Midnight Sun, Inc. was initi0
ated beginning in  in a few joint ventures throughout 
Ukraine. The main business, the South Foods company, was 
founded in the form of a joint venture with the State Property Fund 
(minority stake of %) in . The brand “Chumak” was in0
troduced in the fall of . Today, the Chumak Group includes 
seven companies, in agriculture (), processing (), sales & mar0
keting (), transport (), and catering (). More than , peo0
ple are working in the Group all year round, and during the har0
vest season the staff level increases up to ,–, direct em0
ployees and over , additional workers indirectly involved. The 
total amount of investment in Ukrainian operations has already 
exceeded US$ million. 
 
The land appears to be a vital factor for Chumak operations. To 
date, the company has experienced difficulties in attracting in0
vestments in the local agriculture business. In addition, one of the 
best ways to finance agricultural operations is to be able to secure 
financing by land securities (collateral), which at this moment is 
not possible in Ukraine. Chumak’s agriculture company is culti0
vating over , hectares with its own equipment and under its 
own management. The company has succeeded in signing long0
term rental contracts (from  to  years,  years on average). 
According to Mr. Johann Boden, Managing Director of South 
Foods/Chumak, if they could have the possibility to purchase and 
own their land, the investments and size of operations would in0
crease tremendously. Up to this moment, Chumak’s limitations 
have not been the market but the availability of quality raw mate0
rials. They solve this problem by growing their own tomatoes, cu0
cumbers, sunflower seeds, etc.  
 
Currently, the company uses , hectares of land. For , 
Chumak’s target is to increase to over , hectares; for , 
up to , hectares (depending on legislative developments). 
Chumak sees its long0term necessity (goal) as purchasing up to 
, hectares and cultivating them according to international 
standards, since their business is driven by agriculture. They be0
lieve that Ukraine has some of the best potential in the world in 
terms of agricultural production, and that is one of the key reasons 
they have established Chumak in Ukraine. To cite Mr. Boden, “It's 
self evident that land and land legislative reforms are of great 
importance for the future development and expansion of Chumak.” 
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Impact on the Decision to Invest 
Eighteen firms, or % of respondents, admitted the impor?
tance of land ownership status for their investment decisions, 
with  firms indicating its strong importance. The matrix?
presents the distribution of those  firms which acknowl?
edged the impact of land ownership status on their decision 
to set up Ukrainian operations. 
Is Land Ownership an Important Consideration
in Investment Decisions? 








No Very Important Important Slightly Important
Importance of Land Ownership for Investment  
Decisions, by Type 
percentage of respondents within groups
Investor types/  
Sectors 
Land?
intensive Other Average 
 MNEs    
 Entrepreneurial/ other    
 Invested/committed    
 Prospective    
Again, firms in land?intensive sectors like food/agri process?
ing, real estate, and construction were almost unanimous 
about the significance of land ownership for their investment 
decisions. On the horizontal dimensions of the matrix, en?
trepreneurial/other and committed/invested groups of 
firms were more likely to recognize the impact than the oth?
Eighteen firms, or % 
of respondents, admitted 
the importance of land 
ownership status for their 
investment decisions, 
with  firms indicating 
its strong importance. 
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ers. Yet within land?intensive sectors, prospective investors 
were at least as likely to recognize the significance of land 
ownership in their investment decision making as those who 
already committed their money to Ukraine. 
Impact on Future Plans to Invest/Expand 
Out of  firms surveyed, majority () still the indicated that 
easy land privatisation would boost their activity in Ukraine. 
Some of the firms that did not indicate any impact of land 
privatisation on their investment plans nevertheless indicated 
that they would welcome land privatisation, as it would en?
hance the general business/investment climate, creating an 
indirect benefit for them.  
If Land Were Easily Privatised in Ukraine,
Would It Affect Your Investment Decision? 
Significant 
expansion 
%
Undecided on 
extent of positive 
impact
%
Slight expansion
%
Moderate 
expansion
%
No
%
 
Survey Respondents Who Would Follow Easy Land 
Privatisation in Ukraine by More Investment 
percentage of respondents within groups
Investor types/  
Sectors 
Land in?
tensive Other Average 
 MNEs    
 Entrepreneurial/ other    
 Invested/committed    
 Prospective    
Out of  firms surveyed, 
the majority () still 
indicated that easy land 
privatisation would boost 
their activity in Ukraine. 
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Out of the abovementioned above  respondents, firms in 
land?intensive sectors were more likely to follow the im?
provement of land privatisation by more investment and/or 
expansion of their business activity in Ukraine. However, 
most MNEs in this group indicated indifference to this issue 
and to its impact on their future investments. The reason for 
that is likely to be in the dominance of the market?seeking 
motive over all the rest of their investment motives. As be?
fore, smaller (entrepreneurial) firms appeared more sensitive 
to the land privatisation process across sectors. 
Potential FDI Inflow 
Out of those respondents who indicated the intention to in?
crease their investment in case of easy land privatisation, only 
 respondents dared to specify amounts (US$ million in 
total). However, the responses of the rest of firms lead us to 
believe that potential FDI from smoother land privatisation 
procedures alone might exceed US$ million across our 
sample within a – year span.  
Yet we treat this estimate as biased downward. The fact of full 
land tradability is anticipated to open Ukraine for more in?
vestor groups (especially, for small?scale entrepreneurial), as 
well as open more sectors of the Ukrainian economy for FDI. 
To illustrate the latter, we take the example of Russian retail?
ing described in McKinsey (): in –, the Russian 
economy attracted only US$. billion from multinationals 
investing in modern and more productive chains, versus. 
US$. billion attracted by Poland (and US$. billion in the 
pipeline). To date, Ukraine has attracted none of the multi?
nationals to its retailing, though it is comparable to Poland in 
size. Thus, with clearance of the land privatisation issue, 
Ukraine’s FDI potential in retailing could easily be measured 
in the hundreds of US$ millions over the medium run.  
Another example is the already mentioned hotel business. 
The lack of good hotels at the medium and high end of 
Ukraine’s market is widely recognized. The cost of building a 
new – star hotel with  rooms typically runs at US$ mil?
lion (according to McKinsey’s estimate for Russia), while ?
star hotel projects mostly exceed US$?million budgets. 
Thus, the FDI potential for Ukraine’s hotels can also be 
measured in the hundreds of US$ millions over several years. 
Potential FDI from 
smoother land privatisa0
tion procedures alone 
might exceed US$ 
million across our sample 
within a – year span. 
Yet we treat this estimate 
as biased downward. 
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